Author Zheng Yongnian

On September 24, just as Chinese President Xi Jinping was visiting the United States, Harvard professor Graham Allison published an article in The Atlantic titled "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War? in The Atlantic. Allison wrote, "When Obama meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is on his first state visit to the United States, there is one topic they probably won't put on the agenda: the possibility that the United States and China will find themselves in the midst of a war in the next decade."

In policy circles, the name Ellison should not be unfamiliar even to the Chinese. An expert on U.S. national security and defense policy issues whose research focuses on nuclear weapons, terrorism, and policymaking, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense during the (first) Clinton administration and is now director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.His first book, The Nature of Decision-Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, published in 1971, made him famous, and it remains a must-read for international relations scholars today. It is still required reading for international relations scholars. He later published Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Prevention of Catastrophe (2004) and Lee Kuan Yew: The Master's Insight on China, America, and the World (2013).

In recent years, in light of the importance of the U.S.-China relationship and the likelihood of conflict and war between the two countries, Ellison has initiated The Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard, which seeks to examine the major wars that have occurred as a result of the transfer of power between the great powers in history, to analyze the potential for war between the two countries, and to explore how the two countries can avoid falling into such a trap. The purpose of the project is to analyze the possibility of a war between China and the United States, and at the same time to explore how to prevent the two countries from falling into such a trap.

The results of this project are not small, and in a short period of time, a considerable number of relevant articles have been published in the Western mainstream media. To a large extent, the "Thucydides Trap" has gradually become the mainstream of the Western discourse on Sino-US relations, with the intention of providing strong historical and empirical evidence for the US realist policy towards China.

Where did the proposition of Thucydides' Trap come from? The proposition was made by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides in his account of the war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC. The story goes like this: by the 5th century B.C., the maritime nation of Athens had risen to become the center of ancient Greek civilization, creating unprecedented achievements in all areas. But the rise of Athens led to the profound fear of another land nation, Sparta. This fear of the rise of Athens, despite the fact that Sparta had dominated ancient Greece for a century, prompted Sparta to make various efforts to respond to the rise of Athens.

This created a threat and counter-threat competition between Athens and Sparta, which led to rivalry, which led to the formation of their respective alliances, and which eventually led to war between the two countries. After 30 years of war, both sides eventually declined. Thucydides concludes, "What made the war inevitable was the growing power of Athens, and the fear that this power created in Sparta."

What Ellison and his team have done is to use this Thucydidesian thesis to explain the wars that have occurred in history as a result of great power shifts. According to their statistics, over the past 500 years, there have been wars in 12 out of a total of 16 major shifts of power in the world (i.e., from existing powers to rising powers).

Issues that cannot be avoided
Is the "Thucydides Trap" bound to happen in the relationship between China and the United States as well? As a rising power, China can neither avoid this problem nor, indeed, does it avoid it. If China wants to avoid this "trap", which is regarded as "destiny", it has to find an alternative way. That is to establish a "new type of great power relationship" between the two countries. The "Thucydides Trap" has existed for thousands of years, but as a concept in international relations, it has only become popular in recent years. Although it is not clear whether Ellison's re-emphasis on the "Thucydides Trap" is a response to China's "new type of great power relations", the two concepts have become popular at the same time in recent years, and have a tendency to become "obvious science" of international relations. "The trend of international relations.

We don't know whether Xi and Obama discussed the issue of Sino-U.S. conflict raised by Ellison, but Xi, who embraces the concept of a "new type of great power relationship," made it clear that his trip to the U.S. was about peace and cooperation, not conflict and war. Xi had already begun to discuss how China and the United States could avoid the "Thucydides Trap" by building a "new type of great power relationship" some years ago. This trip to the United States once again clearly emphasized this concept. In his speech at the welcome dinner in Seattle, Xi pointed out that there is no Thucydides Trap in the world, but repeated strategic miscalculations among great powers may create one for themselves.

Xi Jinping's speech is very much like "constructivism" in the study of international relations - if the "Thucydides Trap" is constructed and becomes the mainstream discourse in the relationship between the two countries, this discourse may really become a reality. If the "Thucydides Trap" is constructed and becomes the dominant discourse in the relationship between the two countries, this discourse may really become a reality.

Indeed, this is also true. Although the research on the Thucydides Trap by American scholars is more empirical in nature, it clearly implies a normative dimension, i.e., war as "destiny". More importantly, U.S. scholars have taken the distinctive position in the process of construction that they assume the conflict was caused more by China's actions than anything else. Ellison's "Thucydides Trap Project" explicitly states that "China's rise challenges U.S. dominance in Asia today and in the world in the future," constituting today's "Thucydides Trap. ".

It can be said that the "Thucydides trap" is an old and recent version of Western international relations. Realism emphasizes the "anarchic" structure of international relations. Under this structure, because there is no super-sovereign government, the selfish behavior of sovereign states inevitably leads to war. The dominant factor leading to a change in the behavior of a sovereign state is a change in the actual capabilities of that state. Therefore, regardless of the subjective intentions of China's leaders, as China's actual capabilities increase, China will inevitably be perceived as challenging the existing American hegemony.

The "Thucydides' Trap" discourse in United States policy circles today is a far cry from Thucydides' discourse on Athens and Sparta. Thucydides emphasized the interaction between Athens and Sparta, and that "a slap in the face is not a slap in the face", and that the "trap" is the result of the interaction between the two sides. However, in today's U.S. "Thucydides Trap" discourse, more unilateral accusations of China, while ignoring the U.S. own behavior. Americans ignore their own relative decline in the process of China's excessive "fear", China does everything, as a challenge to the U.S. Therefore, its various diplomatic behavior, such as "return to Asia" and strengthen alliances, seems to regard China as the United States of America. Enemies.

Many important elements

China must explain the United States' misunderstanding of China's behavior, and it should be even more rational about the United States' behavior towards China. However, the most critical thing for China is to avoid the Thucydides Trap by establishing a "new type of great power relationship" in its interaction with the United States. This will not be easy. As Ellison and his team's research shows, in great power relations, conflict is often the norm, and peace the exception. However, for the sake of peace, however difficult it may be, China must pursue this "extraordinary state" even if the chances are slim. Indeed, as things stand, the "extraordinary state" that China seeks is more likely to become the norm in U.S.-China relations. Although still in the process of being constructed, Xi Jinping's "new type of great power relationship" has so far embodied a number of important elements.

First, direct diplomacy between leaders. The leaders of China and the United States have greatly surpassed the Cold War era of the U.S. and Soviet Union in the form of spacing out and name-calling, and have instead engaged in direct contact and prolonged dialogues. Xi Jinping and Obama have had many long, no-issue conversations with each other. Modern multi-interested societies often have multiple diplomatic voices. The United States does not have an abstract "China policy," and China does not have an abstract "U.S. policy."

The formation of a country's foreign policy towards another country is not so much a reaction to the "anarchy" of international politics as a result of the interaction and contestation of different domestic interests. While each sovereign State pursues the maximization of its own national interests in the international arena, it does so in different ways. Some ways lead to conflict, others to peace. In a context of diverse interests and voices, leadership diplomacy is of irreplaceable importance, at least in terms of enabling a country's major foreign policy to be free from all sorts of murmurs, thus avoiding major strategic miscalculations.

Secondly, the shaping of alternative discourses. While the United States is constructing international discourses such as the "Thucydides Trap", China is doing its best to build its own alternative discourse, namely, a "new type of great power relations". Although the United States did not care that much about this concept proposed by China at the beginning, it is gradually accepting it today. At the very least, it has made U.S. policymakers and society realize that the U.S.-China relationship is not as simple as the U.S.-Soviet relationship of the past, but rather a very complex pair of relationships that transcend the bilateral. More importantly, avoiding the "Thucydides Trap" has also become the consensus of the top management of China and the United States.

Third, the construction of a multidimensional bilateral relationship. Today's China-United States relationship is being constructed simultaneously on at least three levels. At the lowest level, the two sides want to prevent the potential for conflict, so they have set up high-level hotlines or direct dialogue mechanisms on crisis management, cybersecurity, and so on. But these are only defensive, and also occurred in the past in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They are important, but must be transcended. At the intermediate level, the development and expansion of common interests emphasized bilaterally is manifested in all aspects, including trade and economy, society, and culture. At the international level, common interests are pursued in nuclear non-proliferation (Iran and North Korea, etc.), environment and climate change, and global governance.

Fourth, unilateral self-restraint. For example, China voluntarily restrained itself from entering into an alliance when the United States strengthened its alliance against China. Historically, all large-scale wars have occurred between two alliances. This is what Thucydides observed, "Both sides (meaning Athens and Sparta) are doing their utmost to prepare for war; and at the same time I see that the rest of the nations in the Hellenistic world are joined either to this side or that; and even those who are not at present engaged in the war are preparing for it."

In contrast, China today emphasizes "strategic partnerships" rather than alliances. The difference between the two is that "strategic partnerships" emphasize crises, challenges and problems that we all face, such as terrorism, climate change and illegal immigration, while alliances tend to target "third countries", i.e., "common enemies". "common enemies". Over the years, even if the United States views China as an "enemy," the Chinese leadership has not viewed the United States as an "enemy". This construct of consciousness is effectively reflected in China's diplomacy with the United States.

Fifthly, the development of defensive capabilities. China is not so naive as to completely ignore the possibility of war. Recent history has taught China that to be backward is to be beaten, and to be poor and weak is to be bullied. China has therefore strengthened its national defense as its economy has risen. However, China's military rise is not about challenging the militaries of existing powers, but rather about assuming regional and international responsibilities based on defending and containing others from challenging it. In terms of general trends, although military cooperation between China and the United States is still limited today, in terms of the need to maintain the global order, the space for military cooperation between the two countries is becoming larger and larger. The strengthening of China's military capabilities, on the contrary, will contribute to the possibility of such cooperation.

Sixth, the rise of openness. Although it is doubtful that interdependence between countries can replace war between countries, there is a consensus that interdependence between countries can reduce the likelihood of inter-State wars or even stop them. China's insistence on openness in its rise to power has made the interests of China and the rest of the world "you have me, I have you". Today, the close economic and trade relationship between China and the United States (some scholars call it "China-US") makes it difficult for the two sides to see each other as real "enemies". With the implementation of China's "Silk Road", China's openness will grow, leading to a mutual accommodation of the interests of China and other countries.

In any case, the relationship between China and the United States is a matter of peace and war in the world. No matter what the cost, China must find a new path to peace. After all, of the 16 power transitions in history, four have been peaceful. There is no reason to believe in the destiny of great power tragedies; what is needed is perseverance with confidence.

This article is the author's personal opinion and does not represent the views of this publication.

Author Bio:

Zheng Yongnian, born in 1962, is currently Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, Co-Editor-in-Chief of China: An International Journal, Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge China Policy Series, and Co-Editor-in-Chief of the World Scientific Series on Contemporary China. China: An International Journal, editor-in-chief of Routledge's China Policy Series, and co-editor-in-chief of World Scientific's Series on Contemporary China. He has served as Assistant Professor and Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Administration at Peking University, Research Fellow and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of East Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and Professor and Director of Research at the Institute for China Policy Studies, University of Nottingham, UK. He has received awards from the Social Science Research Council-MacArthur Foundation (1995-1997) and the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation (2003 2005). rthur Foundation (2003 2005) research grants. 0

Zheng Yongnian received his B.A. in International Relations (1985) and M.A. in Political Science (1988) from Peking University, where he stayed on as a teacher, and later went to the United States to receive his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Princeton University (1995). He is mainly engaged in the study of China's internal transformation and its external relations, with his main interests or research areas being nationalism and international relations; international and regional security in East Asia; China's foreign policy; globalization, state transformation and social justice; technological change and political transformation; social movements and democratization; comparative central-local relations; and Chinese politics.

He has published 13 monographs. Among them, 5 are in English and 8 in Chinese.