{"id":6023,"date":"2024-02-01T12:21:22","date_gmt":"2024-02-01T04:21:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/zh_cn\/?p=6023"},"modified":"2024-02-01T13:14:41","modified_gmt":"2024-02-01T05:14:41","slug":"%e6%9d%8e%e5%bd%95%ef%bc%9a%e4%b8%ad%e5%9b%bd%e6%9c%aa%e6%9d%a520%e5%b9%b4%e7%9a%84%e7%bb%8f%e6%b5%8e%e5%a4%a7%e8%b6%8b%e5%8a%bf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/latest-news\/6023\/","title":{"rendered":"Li Lu: China's Economic Megatrends for the Next 20 Years"},"content":{"rendered":"

This article is reprinted from: Studies in Economic Transformation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the past few years, especially last year, many people were worried about China's macro environment and pessimism spread.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So let's make an exception today and talk about the macro environment. At the end of the day, when we invest in a business in a country, in a sense we are also investing in that country. We need to have a general understanding of that country.
It is also important to note that as investors, we are concerned with predicting the probability of being correct in the future. We try to be objective and rational in our analysis and discard any ideological and emotional bias.
We want to describe the \"real\", not the \"ideal\" or the \"hope\".<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is an outline of my speech today, divided into five parts:<\/strong>
I. Historical and cultural differences between China and the West;
(b) China's modernization and the economic miracle of the past 40 years;
Third, the current pessimism of investors, especially overseas investors, towards China;
IV. Three different stages of economic development: where China stands today in relation to the West;
V. Growth potential of the Chinese economy.
First we will discuss how China and the West are different, how each is unique, and what causes these differences and uniqueness. Most Westerners look at China through Western eyes, while most Chinese look at other countries through Chinese eyes. This difference leads to a lot of confusion and misunderstanding. If you don't understand the historical differences between China and the West and where these differences stem from, you can't really go deep enough to understand and make predictions about how they will evolve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n


In the second part, we will briefly describe China's modernization and explain the economic miracle that China has experienced in the last forty years, i.e., ultra-high economic growth over an extraordinarily long period of time.

In the third part, we will discuss the political and economic environment in China, which is a common concern for investors today, and what exactly characterizes this current era and what it means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the fourth part, we will discuss the three different stages of economic development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, on the basis of these discussions, we can estimate the growth prospects of the Chinese economy in the next 5, 10 or even 20 years.
I realize that this is a very ambitious agenda that covers quite a lot of ground. I apologize that I can only go through it quickly because of time constraints, and this kind of speed-seeking can run counter to the way we work on a daily basis. My aim is to give a broad framework to help you begin to understand the issues.

I. Historical and Cultural Differences between China and the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

First let's discuss what exactly causes the differences and uniqueness between China and the West. From ancient times until recent times, China and the West, or simply East and West, were separated by the Himalayan Mountains and the vast Mongolian steppe, with very little communication between the two.
The civilizations of the East and the West therefore developed independently of each other. Some fortuitous historical events led the East and the West to take different paths at different times, and thus they also reflected different tendencies in the way they approached things and the systems they established. Of course, both Chinese and Westerners are human beings and have human nature in common. But they have developed in different directions, due to the fact that human nature shows different aspects under the influence of different external factors. I will describe some of the basic events that led to these differences, of which geography is the most important.
China is bounded on the west by the Himalayas, the roof of the world, an almost impenetrable barrier to mankind, on the north by the vast, cold Mongolian steppe, and on the east and south by the sea. It is interesting to note that two great rivers, the Yangtze and the Yellow, also originating in the Himalayas, flow in the same direction into the sea.
Before mankind discovered the American continent, this alluvial plain formed between the Yangtze River and the Yellow River was one of the most fertile, vast and suitable lands for farming on earth, and could be considered a heavenly place. As a result, agriculture sprouted here at an early age. These two large river channels, plus a number of tributaries, provided an economical and convenient means of transportation between the various regions of the plains. So as long as a large enough force could be gathered in a certain place, conquering this whole land would not be difficult.
Agricultural civilization is based on photosynthesis, which converts solar energy into crops and stockable animals, and plants and animals are dependent on land. This means that the size of the land determines the agricultural output and the number of people it can support. The scarcity of land has been a consistent theme throughout the history of agricultural civilization.
Once a given society has more land, it produces more people, and when the population gets to a point where it exceeds the limit of what the size of the land can carry, it falls into a Malthusian trap. Wars, plagues, and famines come and go, the population decreases drastically, and another cycle begins.
The economy of an agricultural civilization is a shortage economy, i.e., it is insufficient to sustain the normal scale of population growth, and the total population of mankind can only decrease when it reaches the limit of land output. The reduced population is usually delineated by ethnicity, race and nation. The group that occupies the largest piece of land usually survives, at the cost of the demise of the other groups. Wars in agricultural civilizations are usually fought over more land.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 1 Topographic map of China<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: China Map Publishing House<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization, there have been countless such battles. The ultimate winners were those societies that invented a way to mobilize their people on a large scale, that is, societies with better forms of political organization. Human beings are very interesting in that they are both highly individual and highly social. In this respect, humans are unique among all species. And the Chinese were the first to explore a way of mobilizing society on a large scale.
About 2,400 years ago, the state of Qin, a small state located on the western edge of China, implemented the Shang Yang Law. The significance of Shang Yang's change of law was that it initiated a radical and innovative revolution in the way society was organized.
Before that, since man evolved from animals, it was natural for all human beings to extend their relationship with each other outwards with blood relationship as the core. For the first time, the Qin state broke this blood relationship by stipulating that property could be passed on from one generation to the next, but political power could not be passed on from one generation to the next. Political power was distributed solely on the basis of merit and ability within a generation.
In China before that, and in the West until modern times, the feudal system based on blood ties has been the mainstay. If the previous generation was knighted, the descendants could be knighted for several generations. Political power was distributed and passed on by blood relations, and society was highly solidified, with little opportunity for free floating up and down.
The Shang Yang reforms of the Qin State created a system of meritocracy, whereby talents were selected and political power was distributed on the basis of merit, learning and ability. And this selection and distribution was limited to one generation. The small state of Qin mobilized everyone's strength and eventually conquered the entire Chinese territory and established a huge empire because it provided everyone in the society, regardless of their origins, with an avenue to rise to political power by their own efforts.
For more than 2,000 years since then, all Chinese dynasties have organized their societies in a similar way, and as a result, China has remained very strong during the age of agrarian civilization, with a highly sophisticated and well-developed political system. The Chinese were the first in history to invent a bureaucracy based on meritocracy, and to some extent this tradition continues today, attracting the best and brightest into government. The West has never had such a tradition in its history.
China was the first country to invent the Political Meritocracy, which allowed it to unleash the great potential of the collective. This has always been the hallmark of Chinese civilization.
Let's look at the West again, mainly Europe, because Europe's role in modern history is much more important.
One important feature of Europe's geography is that it is covered with many small rivers flowing in many different directions. The entire region of Europe is not large, but is divided into many small pockets by mountain ranges and complex rivers, making it easy to defend and difficult to attack. This was coupled with the fact that for most of its history, Europe was still covered by dense primary forests.
Thus, during the Roman Empire, Europe was still almost in the age of barbarism. It was not until the fall of the Western Roman Empire that agriculture began to flourish as the virgin forests were slowly cut down. However, due to geographical constraints, the land in Europe could not support a large unified empire, so all efforts to reunite Europe after the Roman Empire ended in failure.
To manage all these small states, it is enough to rely on blood ties centered on the king and nobility and on blood and geographic ties between states. All political power is heritable. As a result, political power in the West never evolved in the egalitarian, meritocratic direction that it did in China before the modern era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 2 Topographic map of Europe<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: China Map Publishing House<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the West has one decisive geographical advantage, an advantage that has proved to be crucial in the last five hundred years of modern history. To understand this advantage, let us first look at the distances between Europe and China and the Americas (Figure 3).
The left and right pictures in Figure 3 are not exactly to scale, but we can roughly see how much the distances between Europe and China and the Americas differ. The distance between Europe and the Americas is about 3,000 miles, and the distance between China and the Americas is about 6,000 miles. Factoring in ocean currents, the distance between China and the Americas is actually much greater than 6,000 miles. Therefore, when European traders began to sail, they were far more likely to reach and discover the American continent than Chinese traders.
Before the emergence of modern technological civilization, it was a fantasy to sail from China to the Americas. Zheng He could only \"Western Ocean\", not \"Eastern Ocean\". But from Europe to reach the Americas by sea is completely possible. This is why the Europeans \"accidentally\" discovered the American continent, this accident contains a geographical advantage of the inevitable.
The significance of this geographical discovery was extraordinary. First, Europeans used it to escape the Malthusian trap for the time being, since the land in North America was much more extensive and fertile than the alluvial plains between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. Because North America's natural endowments for agriculture (primarily the native plant and animal species needed for agriculture) were too poor and because it had been geographically isolated from Eurasia since the Ice Age, the
As a result, agriculture had not yet been developed, so the region was sparsely populated and civilization was extremely backward. When the Europeans set foot on the American continent, they easily subjugated the native peoples, the vast majority of whom died of the diseases that the Europeans brought with them. Suddenly, Europe inherited a huge, fertile land that could support an almost unlimited number of people, thus allowing for free trade and economic prosperity that lasted for centuries in the transatlantic realm.
Of course, if the population kept growing, the land would eventually become unsupportable and still fall into the Malthusian trap. But before that, another major event took place. A new wave of sustained economic growth triggered dramatic changes in both social thought and the natural sciences, culminating in the Enlightenment and the great scientific revolution.
Since then, the combination of the free market economy and modern technology has triggered a paradigm shift in civilization that has truly brought human civilization to a whole new stage. This era is defined by sustained, compounded and unlimited economic growth. This phenomenon is unprecedented in human history.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 3 Distances between Europe and China and the Americas<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: EncyclopaediaBritannica, Inc. 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As mentioned earlier, agricultural civilization is determined by the principle of photosynthesis, and the limit of photosynthesis for energy conversion is limited by the size of the land. There is a natural upper limit to the size of the land, and therefore the economy of an agricultural civilization is a shortage economy. A civilization based on modern science and technology, on the other hand, is able to unleash the dynamics of sustained, compounding economic growth, transforming the shortage economy of the agricultural era into an economy of abundance. The difference is epoch-making.
This new system was the result of Economic Meritocracy. In Europe, people suddenly realized that no matter who you were or what your origins were, you had a free path up the economic ladder and could work your way up.
This system helps to unleash the potential of individuals and small collectives (corporations), and it attracts another aspect of human nature, namely, the unleashing of the power of individuality. This is a phenomenon that has occurred only in the last few centuries of modern history, and it is the political and geographical soil of this new civilization that has been formed by the small vassal states that have divided Europe (the West) and the small colonial powers on the American continent, especially in North America, where the strength of the individual and the small collectivity is a product of modern civilization.
This is why when the West looks at China and when China looks at the West, they are often unable to do so. They always start from their own prejudices and their own successes. For example, if the West succeeds because of the power of individuals and small collectives (companies), they are always skeptical of government intervention. So the first part of my speech today is to set the stage by telling you about these deep and fundamental differences between China and the West, which have a long history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n


II. China's modernization and the economic miracle of the last 40 years<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

China and the modern West met in 1840 in the form of the Opium Wars, when China was forced to open its ports of entry for trade and at the same time had to face the harsh reality that they had completely missed out on the Industrial Revolution and technological civilization while they were still basking in the glory of their agrarian civilization period. The West had been centuries ahead of them in this process. For more than 100 years, China stumbled and struggled in its semi-colonial state.
In 1949, China re-established itself as a unified state under the leadership of the Communist Party, and in the beginning stages embarked on the path of a planned economy, at least in part because the characteristics of a planned economy coincided with the Chinese instinct to organize the collective and unleash its potential.
For the Chinese Government, this is also a natural choice. When a country chooses its destiny and path of development, it will be influenced by deep-rooted historical prejudices. We all know how the planned economy turned out later.
When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he didn't know what the right course was to lead China to prosperity. But Deng had a very practical observation. According to the memoirs of his interpreter, Li Shenzhi, Deng once told Li that he had observed that after World War II all the countries that did well with the United States got rich, and all the countries that did well with the Soviet Union got very poor. This is what Deng told Li Shenzhi during his first visit to the United States in 1978.
After this visit, diplomatic relations were established between China and the United States under the administration of President Jimmy Carter. From then on, Deng Xiaoping broke through the barriers of China's traditional historical prejudices and turned to the American way, beginning to advocate a market economy, opening the doors of the country, and eagerly learning from the United States and the West about modern science and technology and the road to a market economy.
Since then, we have witnessed nearly 40 years of super-fast economic growth in China. The compound growth rate over these 40 years averaged about 9.41 TP3T. In real terms, China's gross domestic product (GDP) has doubled 37 times in 40 years. The fact that the world's most populous country has achieved sustained ultra-high-speed economic growth over an extraordinarily long period of time is an absolute miracle, unprecedented in history.
Now let's explain the reasons for these 40 years of super growth. First some conventional explanations. Deng Xiaoping's reform and open-door policy allowed the Chinese to truly observe the success of the United States, i.e., a model of Western success.
At a time when China was pursuing an open-door policy, the United States was relatively confident, broad-minded and willing to help China. The United States was willing to help China, firstly, because they were both allies against the Soviet Union, and secondly, the United States also had a missionary-like zeal to lead China into modernization, which has always been the history of the United States.
In addition, the world environment was relatively peaceful at the time, consumption in the United States fueled China's economic growth, the world was in the midst of a massive globalization process, China joined the WTO, and so on. China's economic growth could not be achieved without these tailwinds.
In addition, because China was once so backward and had to catch up, it has carefully planned its future path by learning from the successes of other countries, and has generally planned better. Chinese people also have a cultural tradition of hard work, education and entrepreneurial spirit. The experience of the previous decades has encouraged them to cherish the opportunities brought about by the reform and opening-up policy and to work hard.
On the demographic front, through globalization and accession to the WTO, China's hundreds of millions of young workers have been able to integrate rapidly into the global economy. These young people have been able to create enormous output in a very short period of time. And it just so happens that this output can also be absorbed by the world. All of these factors explain to some extent China's decades of rapid growth, but they are not the whole story.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 4 Inflation-adjusted real economic growth rates in China, 1978 to 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First of all, the essence of modern civilization is not a political system, but a combination of a free market economy and modern science and technology. The Chinese have been stumbling in various directions for more than 150 years, and it was not until 1978 that they actually reached this combination.
At that time, there was already a potentially unified market in China, as well as a unified and stable political environment. Once it truly began to embrace the essence of modern civilization, China began to flourish like any other modern country. The economic takeoff of other countries throughout history has followed the same path. One of the most popular international notions is that political democracy is a necessary condition for modernization, but China's success is precisely a counter-example. Political democracy is not a prerequisite for modernization.
Another reason is China's unique political and economic system, which some scholars refer to as the \"three-in-one market mechanism\". As we said in Part I, the Chinese were the first to explore ways to unleash their collective power and potential through political meritocracy.
Over the past 40 years, China has made the most of this historical tradition by organizing its market economy in a unique way. The so-called \"three-in-one market mechanism\" is a close cooperation between the central government, local governments and enterprises.
The central government sets strategy, provides resource support, and regulates the economic cycle - similar to the U.S. federal government. What is unique in China is the competition between local governments. Local governments in China are behaving more like corporations, with these \"corporate local governments\" providing headquarters-style services to real commercial companies.
If companies invest in a factory somewhere, the local government can provide them with land, build roads and bridges, organize the workforce, change the tax system, and even buy the first products the company produces. Local governments do everything they can to help companies get established and succeed. All the company needs to do is seize the market opportunity.
In exchange, the company employs a large number of local laborers, contributes to the GDP, and pays taxes to the local government, but in a sense it is more like paying rent because it is the equivalent of renting a ready-made corporate headquarters.
At the same time, different local governments competed with each other to provide better services to commercial companies, and together with the central government contributed to the long-term growth of the economy. As can be seen in Figure 4, China's economic growth rate has had very few ups and downs over the years.
This unique model has produced ultra-high growth rates over extraordinarily long periods of time with very little cyclical variation. Of course, the low cyclicality is also due to the benign international environment and the open and free trading system.
In recent years, however, the situation has changed. First, when local governments provide commercial services like businesses, they demand rent, and some officials even use their power for personal gain by asking businesses to pay rent directly to individuals.
As a result, while this model has created ultra-high-speed economic growth, it has also spawned serious corruption, rent-seeking, deteriorating environmental pollution, unhealthy competition between different regions, unsustainable polarization between the rich and the poor, and an economy that is highly dependent on debt, which is one of the main modalities used by the central Government to moderate the ups and downs of the economic cycle. These are the shortcomings of the three-in-one market mechanism.
During this period, the international environment also changed. When China became the world's second-largest economy, the world's largest trading nation, and the largest industrialized nation, the economies of other countries and regions did not grow at the rate of 9% to accommodate so much output.
Moreover, one of the results of globalization was that the large industrial countries, which had been developed, were losing the basis of their industrial superiority. In turn, the benefits of globalization for the developed countries have been concentrated and over-distributed to the elites in the fields of science, technology and finance, with the rich and poor becoming increasingly polarized and the living standards of the middle class stagnating. As a result, the anti-globalization movement and various populist political movements began to gather strength.
After 40 years of sustained economic growth in China, its unique development model has run into difficulties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n


III. Current pessimism about China among investors, especially overseas investors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the 18th National Congress, the Chinese government has launched what may be the most comprehensive and sustained anti-corruption campaign, which has lasted more than six full years and is still ongoing. The government has issued a series of reform programs while pursuing two parallel policy goals.
One goal is to strengthen the control of the entire national society through a comprehensive and strict rule of the Party; the other is to simultaneously continue to create medium- to high-speed (as opposed to super-high-speed), sustainable economic growth for China.
But most people focused their questions on the first goal because it brought about a great deal of change, affecting all bureaucracies, all intellectuals, businessmen, and every citizen.
For some time in the past, many people have found it difficult to adapt. It has led to the inaction and chaotic behavior of certain government officials, and even caused some enterprises and consumers to lose confidence in the future, and the financial market fell sharply. This is the background of the \"black swan events\" that have occurred one after another in China in 2018.
The outbreak of the trade war between China and the United States in this period is tantamount to adding insult to injury. Internationally, a new round of \"China's Coming Collapse\" theory has become popular again. This phrase first came out of Gordon Chang's 2001 book The Coming Collapse of China.
This prophecy has flourished many times since then, being repeated every few years by prominent foreign newspapers and magazines, entrepreneurs and politicians. Within China, there is no shortage of people who hold this view.
We have recently witnessed a new wave of pessimism, with the emergence of a new round of predictions of China's imminent collapse. Do those who hold this view, who doubt the ultimate goal of the comprehensive and strict party policy, or even the government's determination to promote the reform and development of the market economy, herald the end of China's ultra-high-speed growth?
But on the flip side, stronger party leadership has also led to a more stable government, a stable country, and a stable, sustained, common and single large market. The anti-corruption campaign has also been effective in curbing corruption and rent-seeking behavior, uprooting entrenched interest groups, and thus making possible economic reforms that would otherwise be difficult to implement. We are also seeing continued and increased investment in technology, education, and the environment, as well as a transition from an export- and investment-oriented to a final-consumption-oriented economy.
Over the past few years, we have seen a lot of changes in society. In some areas, the room for public opinion has been narrowed, but in other areas, these policies have been effective, such as poverty alleviation and environmental protection, and the effects can be said to be immediate. This is how China's domestic environment has changed over the past few years.
Internationally, let's talk a little bit more about the trade war, and a lot of people have asked whether this trade war signals the end of China's growth cycle. Let's look at the data. Figure 5 shows China's net exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, which is calculated by subtracting the value of imports of goods and services from the value of exports of goods and services and dividing by GDP. There have been periods in history when China's net exports have been very high, close to 91 TP3T of GDP. they have also been as low as -41 TP3T. over the past five years, however, China's net exports have averaged around 21 TP3T.
Look again at Figure 6 below and you will see how the influence of international trade on China's economic growth has changed in recent years. Figure 6 shows the contribution of final consumption, investment and net exports of goods and services to China's GDP growth since 2003. A decade or so ago, the contribution of net exports to China's GDP was significant and began to decline in 2008 and 2009 (when China was the main importer supporting the rest of the global economy). Over the past five years, the contribution of final consumption has continued to grow, gross capital formation (i.e., investment) has been relatively lower, and net exports have declined significantly - in other words, China's economy has become significantly less dependent on foreign markets. China's supply-side economic reforms have produced real results.
Shrouded in a forest of worries, fears, complaints and predictions, China's economy is actually quietly changing, with final consumption contributing 76.21 TP3T to GDP growth, gross capital formation contributing 32.41 TP3T, and net exports of goods and services contributing -8.61 TP3T in 2018.The trade conflict between the U.S. and China will certainly cause damage to China's economy and many negative impacts, but it is no longer enough to stop China's sustained economic growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 5 China's net exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, 1960-2017<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 6 Contribution of Final Consumption, Investment and Net Exports of Goods and Services to GDP Growth in China, 2003-2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IV. Three different stages of economic development: where China stands today in relation to the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In development economics, the Lewis inflection point is an important concept. In the early stages of industrialization, the rural surplus labour force was constantly attracted to urban industry, but as industry grew to a certain size, the rural surplus labour force changed from surplus to shortage - this inflection point is known as the Lewis inflection point.
This observation was first made by British economist W. Arthur Lewis in the 1950s.
Before the Lewis inflection point, i.e., during the early industrialization of towns and cities, capital had absolute control, and it was generally difficult for labor to have pricing power and bargaining power, but because there was a lot of surplus population in the countryside, there were a lot of people looking for work, and firms naturally exploited workers.
After the Lewis inflection point, the economy enters a mature stage of development, when firms need to increase output through higher investment in production facilities, while catering to the needs of their employees by increasing wages, improving the working environment and production facilities, and so on.
During this period, because the labor force has begun to run short, economic development leads to rising wage levels, which in turn causes consumption levels to rise, and savings levels and investment levels to rise, so that the company's profits rise as well, creating an interplaying, upward positive cycle.
In this stage, almost everyone in society can enjoy the fruits of economic development, and at the same time, a consumer society dominated by the middle class will be formed, and the whole country will enter the golden age of economic development. That is why this stage is also called the Golden Age.
Today's economy is a globalized economy. When the golden state lasts for a while and wages increase to a certain level, it becomes more attractive for companies to produce overseas in other emerging economies.
At this point, firms begin to slowly shift their investments to developing countries, which begin to enter into their own industrialization process. If this happens on a large scale in the home country, investment in the home country decreases and the wages of the home country's workers, especially those with low skills, stop rising or even fall.
At this stage, the economy was still growing, but the fruits of economic development were no longer equalized for all segments of society. Laborers need to survive on their own. Those jobs that are more skilled, such as science and technology, finance, and international market type jobs will have high returns, as will the overseas returns on capital. But the overall wage level of society will stagnate, and domestic investment opportunities will be greatly reduced. American economist Mr. Richard Koo calls this stage the post-Lewis inflection point stage of being caught up.
Today's major Western countries slowly entered the third phase (the catching-up phase) in the 1970s. Emerging countries that were once catching up, such as Japan, also began to enter the catching-up stage after the 1990s.
For China, although different observers have suggested different specific times, by and large China should have crossed the Lewis inflection point in the past few years and started to enter into mature economic development. As the following charts show, China has begun to show accelerated growth in wage levels, consumption levels, and investment levels in recent years.
At different stages of economic development, government macroeconomic policies can have different functions. In the early stages of industrialization, government fiscal policy plays a huge role, and investments in infrastructure, resources and export-related services help emerging countries to move rapidly into an industrialized state. In the mature post-Lewis phase, economic development relies mainly on domestic consumption, and private-sector entrepreneurs at the forefront of the market are in a better position to capitalize on the fast-changing business opportunities of the market.
It is at this point that further investment relying on fiscal policy begins to conflict with private sector investment and compete with each other for resources. During this period, monetary policy is more effective in mobilizing the private sector and promoting economic development. At the stage of being caught up, the private sector is reluctant to invest domestically because of the deterioration of the domestic investment climate and the reduction of investment opportunities, as overseas investments are more profitable.
At this point, the Government's fiscal policy becomes even more important to compensate for the lack of private sector investment in the country and for the fact that the population is over-saving and under-consuming. Monetary policy, on the contrary, often fails at this stage.
However, because of the relatively strong inertia of the Government, often when the stage of economic development changes, the implementation of policies is still stuck in the successful experience of the previous stage of development. For example, in today's West, macro policy still relies mainly on monetary policy that was more effective in the golden age, but in terms of actual results, the effectiveness of these policies is very low, so much so that to this day, many Western countries, especially in Europe and Japan, are still experiencing very low inflation and extremely slow economic growth in the face of monetary overshooting, zero interest rates or even negative interest rates.
Similarly, when the Chinese economy has begun to enter the mature stage of the post-Lewis inflection point, the government's fiscal policy is still strong and the government's use of monetary policy remains relatively weak. Over the past few years, the private sector has been squeezed to some extent by various fiscal policies and state-owned enterprises, and there has been a tendency to narrow space in certain areas. These misalignments between macroeconomic policies and stages of economic development have occurred in all countries at all stages.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 8 Per capita consumption expenditure of urban households<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 9 Consumption expenditure per rural household<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 10 Fixed Asset Investment (Excluding Agriculture)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, People's Bank of China (adjusted for price factors).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it cannot be denied that China is still in the golden age of economic development and still has a cost advantage over developed Western countries, while other emerging developing countries behind it (such as India, etc.) have not yet developed a systematic competitive advantage.
In the next few years, China's wage level, savings level, investment level and consumption level will continue to catch up with each other in an upward spiral, in a positive cycle of mutual promotion, and investment opportunities will remain abundant and excellent. If the government can utilize more macro-monetary policies to support the private sector in this phase, it will be very beneficial to the economic development in this phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

V. Growth potential of the Chinese economy<\/strong>

With the above foundation, we can try to answer the question: how should we estimate China's economic growth potential in the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years or even longer?
First, as mentioned earlier, modern civilization is based on the combination of modern technology and a free market economy, and has little to do with the way politics is organized. Instead, technological density is directly related to economic growth. When you consider the current state of higher education in China, when you consider China's per capita GDP and per capita R&D expenditures, you realize that China has a lot of potential. China graduated 7.5 million college students last year, 4.7 million of whom were in STEM majors.
In contrast, the number of graduates in STEM majors from US universities, at around 500,000, is only one-tenth that of China, which is expected to have a total of nearly 200 million college students in 2 years' time, which is already close to the entire working population of the US. China is about to enjoy a huge engineer's dividend.
Something similar happened in early 1978, when hundreds of millions of young people from China's rural areas relocated to the big cities, willing to work as hard as they could, regardless of the difficulty of the job and the pay. China's economic takeoff in the last few decades has been driven by the labor dividend and the job opportunities brought about by globalization.
Today we are about to usher in the era of the Engineer Dividend, enjoying the economic transformation and upgrading and the affluent society that the Engineer Dividend brings. Huawei is a good example of this, as they employ about 150,000 engineers, all of whom have at least a bachelor's degree in engineering, and most of whom also have a master's degree or higher.
Huawei pays them roughly a fraction of the salaries paid for equivalent positions in Seattle or San Francisco's Silicon Valley, but Huawei's engineers are known in the industry for their hard work and dedication. They are as smart and as professionally trained as those engineers in Seattle or San Francisco's Silicon Valley. Therein lies the competitive potential that China is about to unleash.
Let's further discuss the engineer's dividend. GDP per capita and R&D spending as a percentage of GDP are shown for a number of countries and regions in Figure 11.In 2017, China's GDP per capita was close to $9,000 (in 2018, China's GDP per capita was close to $10,000). In terms of GDP per capita, China is comparable to Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. However, China's R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP is much higher than those countries, at 2.13%.
In comparison, Brazil is 1.27%, Thailand is 0.78%, and Mexico is only 0.49%. China's R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP are even higher than those of Spain and Portugal. Spain's GDP per capita is three times that of China, and Portugal's GDP per capita is twice that of China. That is to say, China's R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP is higher than those countries whose per capita GDP is two or three times as high, and much higher than those countries that have the same level of per capita GDP as China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 11 Comparison of GDP per capita and R&D expenditure per capita in different countries (regions)
Source: World Bank. GDP per capita is 2017 data in nominal dollars. Data on R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP are for 2017, except for Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand, where data are for 2016.
So how to unlock the potential of China's GDP per capita? Urbanization rate is another important factor. All those countries with higher GDP per capita and higher R&D expenditures have an urbanization rate of around 70%, while today China's urbanization rate is only 55%. And this figure is somewhat exaggerated because it includes 180 million migrant workers, who are living in the cities but do not have urban household registration.
Only those who have a hukou are entitled to a range of social benefits, including education, retirement and medical benefits. With these guarantees, and with fewer worries, people will be more willing to spend. Therefore, these 180 million rural migrant workers are not full participants in urban life. Not to mention the 45% rural population who live entirely outside the cities.
However, the Chinese government's plan to urbanize at a rate of 11 TP3T per year over the next 20 years means that approximately 300 million people will become new consumers over the next 20 years. That's the whole point of participating in the urbanization process - to become consumers.
Once you actually join city life and have basic social security, you begin to consume, you begin to make money, and you begin to enter into the economic cycle, just like all the citizens around you. The result is sustainable economic growth.
Another question is: Does China have enough money to support urbanization, to support construction, to support manufacturing upgrades? It just so happens that China has another feature that could help with this.
As shown in Figure 12, this is China's national savings rate from 1952 to 2017. Even before the reform and opening up, China's savings
The savings rate has also remained high. What is very interesting is that while consumption levels have risen sharply in recent years, savings rates have also risen. Last year, China, the world's second largest economy, still had a savings rate of 45%. A high savings rate is a resource that supports further consumption and investment.
A high savings rate also addresses one thing that worries many - high debt levels. China's debt levels have been rising since 2008, when the country began a sustained period of heavy investment in response to the global recession triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, relying on debt financing, primarily through currency issuance. Traditionally, China's social financing has come mainly from bank debt, sometimes as high as 80-90%. Stock market and equity financing account for a very low percentage of overall financing.
But whether it is debt or equity, their source is the same; they do not come from the United States or any other country, but directly from their own depositors. Almost all Chinese debt is owed to the Chinese themselves and is issued in the local currency. So despite the high share of debt, the likelihood of a financial crisis as a result is not high, at least for now.
The next step that the Chinese government would like to take is to fundamentally change China's financing structure through capital market reform, greatly increasing the weight of equity and reducing the proportion of debt. The newly-launched \"Science and Innovation Board\" will adopt the same model as the United States, i.e., a registration system for capital issuance based on information disclosure, rather than the previous approval system.
This means that any company wishing to go public can access the capital market in a shorter period of time in a more liberal manner and obtain capital in a free competitive manner. Of course the Government will monitor them afterwards. This model is the same as that of the United States.
Starting with the registration system reform, China will slowly adjust the structure of social financing, gradually lowering bank debt from a high ratio of 80-90%. A complex and mature economy should not have such a high bank debt ratio. Therefore, capital market reform will be the key to unlocking the problem of high debt ratios and improving financing efficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 12 China's national savings rate, 1952-2017<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But China can be independent of foreign capital. Capital can be drawn directly from domestic savings. It is a product of Chinese culture that the savings rate has remained high even as Chinese households have become wealthy. Figure 12 clearly shows that the Chinese are not satisfied, they want to invest more, they don't want to sit on their savings.
If the reform of China's capital market can transform this desire into effective investment, and realize economic transformation and upgrading through continuous investment in education and technology, thus realizing a continuous positive cycle of economic growth, personal wealth growth, consumption upgrading, and increased investment, it will be possible to realize the long-term sustainable growth of China's economy.
Another dimension in understanding China's economic future is the flexibility and practicality of the Chinese government in dealing with major issues and crises. Today, the Chinese government's two goals, namely, comprehensive and strict party governance and maintaining medium- to high-speed and sustainable economic growth, are both unified and somewhat contradictory, and sometimes may even evolve into crises if not handled well.
But in responding to the crisis, we have also seen that the Chinese government has shown enough flexibility and pragmatism to prioritize between its two main objectives. For example, the Chinese government has adjusted its negotiation strategy with the United States on the trade conflict between China and the United States, and it has also changed some of its previous treatment of private entrepreneurs and its lending policies to private companies, especially its treatment of private financial stakes in the securities market crash. Of course, it is difficult to reverse the damage that has been done, and it will take some time for the wounds to heal.
In addition, the fact that the result of comprehensive and strict party rule may be more and more political stability rather than the opposite may be difficult to understand and accept by domestic and foreign observers sympathetic to the Western model. But the reality is that this is true, and there are plenty of past and contemporary cases to support it.
In this situation, people will find ways to adapt. Regardless of how much dissatisfaction people may have with today's situation, most are not willing to leave China. They can neither take their wealth nor their careers with them.
As policies improve and time passes, things return to normal. Businessmen will continue to run their businesses. The wealth will not flow out of China; productive assets will not be lost. Most of society, even the Chinese government, will learn to adapt. If the Chinese government is flexible and adaptable, I think Chinese society as a whole is bound to be flexible and adaptable as well.
When conflicts erupt, we see a constant switching of priorities between the two goals. As long as the government does not change the goal of economic reform and development, China's economy will continue to grow in a large, stable and single market.
So how far can the Chinese economy go under the existing political and economic model? Of course no one can give a definite answer to this. Therefore, in order to predict the future of the Chinese economy, it is best to refer to the development experience of countries organized in a similar political and cultural manner.
\u4e1c\u4e9a\u540c\u6837\u53d7\u5112\u6559\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\u3001\u5730\u533a\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u65e5\u672c\u3001\u97e9\u56fd\u3001\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u9999\u6e2f\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u53f0\u6e7e\uff0c\u5c3d\u7ba1\u65e0\u8bba\u662f\u653f\u5e9c\u7ba1\u63a7\u7a0b\u5ea6\u8fd8\u662f\u4eba\u53e3\u6570\u91cf\u4e0a\u90fd\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u5f88\u5927\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u4ed6\u4eec\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u5386\u7a0b\u4ecd\u5bf9\u9884\u6d4b\u4e2d\u56fd\u7ecf\u6d4e\u524d\u666f\u5177\u6709\u542f\u53d1\u610f\u4e49\u3002
\u65e5\u672c\u57281962\u5e74\u9996\u6b21\u8fbe\u523010,000\u7f8e\u5143\u4eba\u5747GDP\u6c34\u5e73\uff082010\u5e74\u4e0d\u53d8\u4ef7\u7f8e\u5143\uff09\u3002\u968f\u540e\u768424\u5e74\u91cc\uff0c\u5176GDP\u5e73\u5747\u590d\u5408\u589e\u957f\u7387\u7ea6\u4e3a6.1%\uff0c\u4e00\u76f4\u6301\u7eed\u523030,000\u7f8e\u5143\u4eba\u5747GDP\u6c34\u5e73\uff08\u56fe13\uff09\u3002\u7136\u540e\u589e\u957f\u7387\u5f00\u59cb\u653e\u7f13\u3002
\u97e9\u56fd\u57281993\u5e74\u7a81\u7834\u4e8610,000\u7f8e\u5143\u5927\u5173\u3002\u968f\u540e24\u5e74\uff0cGDP\u5e73\u5747\u590d\u5408\u589e\u957f\u7387\u4e3a4.7%\uff0c\u76f4\u81f3\u8fbe\u523025,000\u7f8e\u5143\u4ee5\u4e0a\uff08\u56fe14\uff09\u3002
\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7684\u590d\u5408\u589e\u957f\u7387\u9ad8\u8fbe8.2%\uff0c\u5e76\u5728\u8f83\u77ed\u7684\u65f6\u95f4\u5185\u4ece\u4eba\u574710,000\u7f8e\u5143\u4e00\u76f4\u589e\u957f\u523030,000\u7f8e\u5143\uff08\u56fe15\uff09\u3002
\u4e2d\u56fd\u9999\u6e2f\u4e5f\u662f\u7c7b\u4f3c\uff0c\u670928\u5e7410%\u7684\u589e\u957f\u7387\uff08\u56fe16\uff09\u3002
\u5f53\u7136\uff0c\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u548c\u9999\u6e2f\u90fd\u662f\u5f88\u5c0f\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4f53\uff0c\u56e0\u6b64\u4e0d\u592a\u5177\u6709\u53ef\u6bd4\u6027\u3002
\u97e9\u56fd\u548c\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u6570\u636e\u66f4\u5177\u9884\u6d4b\u6027\u3002\u4ed6\u4eec\u5728\u653f\u6cbb\u4e0a\u7684\u7ec4\u7ec7\u65b9\u5f0f\u548c\u4e2d\u56fd\u7c7b\u4f3c\uff0c\u4e5f\u548c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e00\u6837\u91cd\u89c6\u6559\u80b2\u3001\u6280\u672f\u3001\u4ea7\u4e1a\u5347\u7ea7\u5e76\u4e14\u5f3a\u8c03\u56fd\u5185\u6d88\u8d39\uff0c\u65e5\u672c\u5c24\u5176\u5982\u6b64\u3002\u97e9\u56fd\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4ecd\u7136\u975e\u5e38\u4f9d\u8d56\u5916\u56fd\u3002\u4f46\u4ed6\u4eec\u90fd\u591a\u591a\u5c11\u5c11\u8f6c\u79fb\u4e86\u4e00\u4e9b\u91cd\u5fc3\u5230\u6d88\u8d39\u4e0a\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u56fe13 \u65e5\u672c1961\u20141985\u5e74\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u7387\u53ca\u4eba\u5747GDP\uff082010\u4e0d\u53d8\u4ef7\u7f8e\u5143\uff09<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u8fd9\u4e9b\u4e1c\u4e9a\u5112\u6559\u56fd\u5bb6\u7684\u7ecf\u5386\u53ef\u4ee5\u5e2e\u52a9\u6211\u4eec\u4f30\u6d4b\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u589e\u957f\u6f5c\u529b\u5f88\u6709\u5e2e\u52a9\u3002\u5927\u5bb6\u90fd\u76f8\u4fe1\u8d24\u80fd\u5236\uff08Meritocracy\uff09\u7684\u6587\u5316\uff0c\u90fd\u6709\u5f88\u9ad8\u7684\u50a8\u84c4\u7387\uff0c\u91cd\u89c6\u6559\u80b2\u3001\u79d1\u6280\uff0c\u5728\u5230\u8fbe10,000\u7f8e\u5143\u4eba\u5747GDP\u65f6\u8fd8\u8868\u73b0\u51fa\u5f3a\u70c8\u7684\u4f01\u56fe\u5fc3\uff0c\u800c\u4e14\u4ed6\u4eec\u5927\u591a\u6570\u5728\u793e\u4f1a\u7ec4\u7ec7\u65b9\u5f0f\u4e0a\u4e5f\u548c\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u7c7b\u4f3c\u4e4b\u5904\uff0c\u5728\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e0a\u653f\u5e9c\u90fd\u626e\u6f14\u7740\u6bd4\u897f\u65b9\u56fd\u5bb6\u66f4\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u89d2\u8272\u3002\u4e2d\u56fd\u793e\u4f1a\u5f88\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u8d70\u51fa\u7c7b\u4f3c\u7684\u8f68\u8ff9\u3002
\u4f46\u6211\u4eec\u662f\u81ea\u4e0b\u800c\u4e0a\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u8005\u3002\u6211\u4eec\u7684\u6295\u8d44\u4e00\u822c\u4e0d\u53d7\u6574\u4f53\u5b8f\u89c2\u73af\u5883\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u3002\u4eca\u5929\u6211\u4eec\u4e4b\u6240\u4ee5\u8981\u8ba8\u8bba\u8fd9\u4e9b\u95ee\u9898\uff0c\u662f\u56e0\u4e3a\u6211\u4eec\u6240\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u516c\u53f8\u5728\u67d0\u79cd\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e0a\u4e0e\u5b83\u4eec\u6240\u5728\u56fd\u5bb6\u7684\u547d\u8fd0\u4e5f\u662f\u606f\u606f\u76f8\u5173\u7684\u3002
\u6240\u4ee5\u6211\u4eec\u8981\u5bf9\u8fd9\u4e2a\u56fd\u5bb6\u6709\u4e00\u4e2a\u7c97\u7565\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u8ba4\u77e5\u4e0d\u4e00\u5b9a\u8981\u975e\u5e38\u7cbe\u786e\uff0c\u4e5f\u4e0d\u9700\u8981\u65f6\u65f6\u6b63\u786e\u3002\u6211\u4eec\u53ea\u9700\u8981\u5bf9\u6240\u6295\u6ce8\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\u672a\u676520\u5e74\u621630\u5e74\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u6709\u4e2a\u5927\u81f4\u7684\u63a8\u6d4b\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u4eec\u8981\u505a\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5206\u6790\uff0c\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u6211\u4eec\u8981\u601d\u8003\u8fd9\u4e9b\u95ee\u9898\u3002
\u6211\u4eec\u5df2\u7ecf\u8ba8\u8bba\u4e86\u8bb8\u591a\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u65b9\u9762\uff0c\u6765\u5e2e\u52a9\u4f60\u66f4\u52a0\u516c\u5141\u3001\u5ba2\u89c2\u5730\u4e86\u89e3\u5927\u5c40\u3002\u6240\u4ee5\u4e0b\u6b21\u4f60\u4eec\u770b\u5230\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u77e5\u540d\u62a5\u520a\u8c08\u8bba\u5230\u4e2d\u56fd\u65f6\uff0c\u522b\u5fd8\u4e86\u4ed6\u4eec\u7684\u56fa\u6709\u504f\u89c1\u3002
\u8fd9\u4e9b\u504f\u89c1\u6765\u81ea\u4e8e\u4ed6\u4eec\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u7ecf\u5386\u548c\u6210\u529f\u7ecf\u9a8c\u3002\u4ed6\u4eec\u503e\u5411\u4e8e\u7531\u6b64\u53bb\u8bc4\u5224\u90a3\u4e9b\u548c\u81ea\u5df1\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u4e1c\u897f\u3002\u5f53\u4f60\u770b\u5230\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u67d0\u4e2a\u95ee\u9898\u505a\u51fa\u56de\u5e94\u65f6\uff0c\u901a\u5e38\u4e5f\u662f\u6e90\u4e8e\u4ed6\u4eec\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u7ecf\u5386\u3001\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u6210\u529f\u7ecf\u9a8c\u548c\u81ea\u5df1\u7684\u504f\u89c1\u3002\u4f60\u8981\u6709\u62e8\u4e91\u89c1\u65e5\u7684\u80fd\u529b\u3002
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u56fe14 \u97e9\u56fd1992\u20142017\u5e74\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u7387\u53ca\u4eba\u5747GDP\uff082010\u4e0d\u53d8\u4ef7\u7f8e\u5143\uff09<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u56fe15 \u65b0\u52a0\u57611976\u20141997\u5e74\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u7387\u53ca\u4eba\u5747GDP\uff082010\u4e0d\u53d8\u4ef7\u7f8e\u5143\uff09<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u56fe16 \u4e2d\u56fd\u9999\u6e2f1979\u20142007\u5e74\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u7387\u53ca\u4eba\u5747GDP\uff082010\u5e74\u4e0d\u53d8\u4ef7\u7f8e\u5143\uff09
\u6765\u6e90\uff1a\u4e16\u754c\u94f6\u884c<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u603b\u7ed3<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u6700\u540e\u603b\u7ed3\u4e00\u4e0b\uff0c\u5730\u7406\u4f4d\u7f6e\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\u51b3\u5b9a\u4e86\u4e2d\u56fd\u548c\u897f\u65b9\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u8d70\u51fa\u4e86\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u9053\u8def\uff0c\u653f\u5e9c\u5728\u4e24\u79cd\u6587\u5316\u4e2d\u626e\u6f14\u4e86\u975e\u5e38\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u89d2\u8272\u3002
\u4e2d\u56fd\u5728\u5386\u53f2\u4e0a\u53d1\u660e\u4e86\u653f\u6cbb\u4e0a\u7684\u8d24\u80fd\u5236\uff0c\u4f7f\u5f97\u4e2d\u56fd\u5728\u519c\u4e1a\u6587\u660e\u65f6\u671f\u7684\u7edd\u5927\u90e8\u5206\u65f6\u95f4\u9886\u5148\u4e8e\u6b27\u6d32\u3002\u540c\u6837\uff0c\u4e5f\u662f\u5730\u7406\u56e0\u7d20\u5e2e\u52a9\u6b27\u6d32\u6700\u5148\u53d1\u73b0\u4e86\u65b0\u5927\u9646\uff0c\u5e76\u4fc3\u4f7f\u897f\u65b9\u53d1\u660e\u4e86\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e0a\u7684\u8d24\u80fd\u5236\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u628a\u4eba\u7c7b\u5e26\u5165\u4e86\u65b0\u7684\u73b0\u4ee3\u6587\u660e\u3002
\u7ecf\u8fc7\u4e86100\u591a\u5e74\u7684\u632b\u6298\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u7ec8\u4e8e\u5728\u8fc7\u53bb40\u5e74\u91cc\u53d1\u73b0\u4e86\u73b0\u4ee3\u6587\u660e\u7684\u7cbe\u9ad3\uff0c\u4e5f\u5373\u73b0\u4ee3\u79d1\u6280\u548c\u5e02\u573a\u7ecf\u6d4e\u7684\u7ed3\u5408\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u572840\u5e74\u4e2d\u521b\u9020\u51fa\u8d85\u957f\u671f\u7684\u3001\u9ad8\u901f\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u5947\u8ff9\uff0c\u800c\u8fd9\u5176\u4e2d\u4e2d\u56fd\u72ec\u7279\u7684\u6587\u5316\u548c\u793e\u4f1a\u6cbb\u7406\u4f18\u52bf\u4e5f\u4e0d\u53ef\u6216\u7f3a\u3002
\u5728\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u73af\u5883\u4e0b\uff0c\u6267\u653f\u515a\u548c\u653f\u5e9c\u5bf9\u4e8e\u793e\u4f1a\u7684\u7ba1\u63a7\u66f4\u52a0\u4e25\u683c\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u793e\u4f1a\u6cbb\u7406\u7684\u6839\u672c\u76ee\u6807\u5e76\u672a\u53d1\u751f\u53d8\u5316\uff0c\u5c31\u662f\u8981\u5728\u672a\u6765\u51e0\u5341\u5e74\u91cc\u7ee7\u7eed\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u521b\u9020\u4e00\u4e2a\u53ef\u6301\u7eed\u7684\u4e2d\u9ad8\u901f\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\u3002
\u5c3d\u7ba1\u548c\u7f8e\u56fd\u7684\u8d38\u6613\u51b2\u7a81\u52a0\u5927\u4e86\u56fd\u9645\u7ecf\u6d4e\u7684\u4e0d\u786e\u5b9a\u6027\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u4eca\u5929\u4e2d\u56fd\u5df2\u7ecf\u4e0d\u518d\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u5b8c\u5168\u4f9d\u8d56\u51fa\u53e3\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\uff0c\u800c\u6b63\u5728\u8fc5\u901f\u6210\u957f\u4e3a\u4e16\u754c\u4e0a\u589e\u957f\u901f\u5ea6\u6700\u5feb\u7684\u8fdb\u53e3\u5927\u56fd\u3002\u4e2d\u56fd\u548c\u7f8e\u56fd\u51fa\u4e8e\u5bf9\u5404\u81ea\u81ea\u8eab\u5229\u76ca\u7684\u8003\u8651\uff0c\u6781\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u5728\u8d38\u6613\u548c\u7ecf\u6d4e\u7684\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u95ee\u9898\u4e0a\u5f62\u6210\u59a5\u534f\u3002
\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u5df2\u7ecf\u901a\u8fc7\u4e86\u5218\u6613\u65af\u62d0\u70b9\uff0c\u8fdb\u5165\u5230\u4e86\u7ecf\u6d4e\u53d1\u5c55\u6210\u719f\u7684\u9ec4\u91d1\u671f\uff0c\u5de5\u8d44\u6c34\u5e73\u3001\u6d88\u8d39\u6c34\u5e73\u3001\u50a8\u84c4\u548c\u6295\u8d44\u6c34\u5e73\uff0c\u90fd\u8fdb\u5165\u4e86\u4e92\u76f8\u8ffd\u8d76\u5f0f\u7684\u87ba\u65cb\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u4e3a\u521b\u9020\u4e2d\u4ea7\u9636\u7ea7\u6d88\u8d39\u793e\u4f1a\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86\u826f\u597d\u7684\u73af\u5883\u3002\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u6587\u5316\u548c\u56fd\u7b56\u4f7f\u5b83\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u907f\u514d\u4e2d\u7b49\u6536\u5165\u9677\u9631\uff0c\u800c\u8fdb\u5165\u5230\u9ad8\u5ea6\u53d1\u8fbe\u56fd\u5bb6\u7684\u884c\u5217\uff0c\u8fd9\u5176\u4e2d\u6709\u5404\u79cd\u56e0\u7d20\u7684\u4f5c\u7528\u3002
\u8fd9\u4e9b\u56e0\u7d20\u5305\u62ec\u5728\u79d1\u7814\u4e0a\u6301\u7eed\u7684\u9ad8\u6295\u5165\uff0c\u53d7\u8fc7\u9ad8\u7b49\u6559\u80b2\u7684\u52b3\u52a8\u529b\u4eba\u53e3\u6570\u91cf\uff0c\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u5de5\u7a0b\u5e08\u7fa4\u4f53\u7684\u8fc5\u901f\u6269\u5927\uff0c\u65e5\u76ca\u63a8\u8fdb\u7684\u57ce\u5e02\u5316\u8fdb\u7a0b\uff0c\u5c45\u6c11\u7684\u9ad8\u50a8\u84c4\u548c\u9ad8\u6295\u8d44\uff0c\u7a33\u5b9a\u7684\u653f\u6cbb\u73af\u5883\u548c\u5de8\u5927\u7684\u56fd\u5185\u5e02\u573a\u7b49\u7b49\u3002
\u6211\u4eec\u4e5f\u770b\u5230\u548c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5177\u6709\u540c\u6837\u5112\u6559\u4f20\u7edf\u7684\u5176\u4ed6\u4e00\u4e9b\u4e1c\u4e9a\u56fd\u5bb6\uff0c\u90fd\u5728\u8fbe\u5230\u4e2d\u7b49\u6536\u5165\u6c34\u5e73\u4e4b\u540e\u53c8\u6301\u7eed\u4e86\u5f88\u957f\u65f6\u95f4\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u6700\u7ec8\u6210\u4e3a\u4e86\u9ad8\u6536\u5165\u56fd\u5bb6\u3002
\u6700\u540e\uff0c\u4f5c\u4e3a\u57fa\u672c\u9762\u6295\u8d44\u4eba\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u4e3a\u4ec0\u4e48\u73b0\u5728\u6295\u8d44\u4e2d\u56fd\u5462\uff1f\u56e0\u4e3a\u5728\u90a3\u91cc\u6211\u4eec\u4ecd\u7136\u80fd\u591f\u53d1\u73b0\u4e00\u4e9b\u4f18\u79c0\u9f99\u5934\u4f01\u4e1a\uff0c\u5b83\u4eec\u6bd4\u897f\u65b9\u7684\u540c\u7c7b\u516c\u53f8\u66f4\u4fbf\u5b9c\uff0c\u800c\u4e14\u589e\u957f\u901f\u5ea6\u66f4\u5feb\u3002\u8fd9\u5c31\u662f\u6211\u4eec\u5728\u4e2d\u56fd\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u903b\u8f91\u3002<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u672c\u6587\u8f6c\u8f7d\u81ea\uff1a\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8f6c\u578b\u7814\u7a76 \u5728\u8fc7\u53bb\u7684\u51e0\u5e74\u91cc\uff0c\u7279\u522b\u662f\u53bb\u5e74 [\u2026]<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6025,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":1,"footnotes":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6023","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-latest-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6023","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6023"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6023\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6067,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6023\/revisions\/6067"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6025"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6023"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6023"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.yzzks.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6023"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}